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Security of Streaming Media Communications 
with Logistic Map and Self-Adaptive 
Detection-Based Steganography 
 
Jinghui Peng, Yijing Jiang, Shanyu Tang, and Farid Meziane, Fellow, BCS 
Abstract—Voice over IP (VoIP) is finding its way into several applications, but its security concerns still remain. This paper 
shows how a new self-adaptive steganographic method can ensure the security of covert VoIP communications over the 
Internet. In this study an Active Voice Period Detection algorithm is devised for PCM codec to detect whether a VoIP packet 
carries active or inactive voice data, and the data embedding location in a VoIP stream is chosen randomly according to random 
sequences generated from a logistic chaotic map. The initial parameters of the chaotic map and the selection of where to 
embed the message are negotiated between the communicating parties. Steganography experiments on active and inactive 
voice periods were carried out using a VoIP communications system. Performance evaluation and security analysis indicates 
that the proposed VoIP steganographic scheme can withstand statistical detection, and achieve secure real-time covert 
communications with high speech quality and negligible signal distortion. 
Index Terms— Security, VoIP, streaming communications, steganography  
——————————   !   —————————— 
1   INTRODUCTION
ITH the development of the Internet, text 
messaging alone is hard to meet people’s demands 
for multimedia communications. Internet users need 
more direct and vivid modern ways of communication, 
such as audio or video communications. Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) is one of the most popular audio 
communications services on the Internet. VoIP is finding 
its way into several applications, and it is expected to be-
come a service like electricity or water. 
The Internet enables VoIP to provide reliable, global, 
low-cost and/or even free services, so many users 
communicate with each other daily using VoIP products, 
leading to increasing traffic of VoIP streams transmitted 
over the Internet. Due to the highly redundant 
representation in VoIP streams, VoIP is considered to be a 
dynamic cover object for steganography compared with 
static cover objects such as text, image and audio files [1-2]. 
As an interesting subject in the field of information security, 
steganography or covert communication (channel) works by 
hiding messages in inconspicuous cover objects (e.g. VoIP 
streams) that are then sent to the intended recipient [1]. 
Steganography can provide an additional layer of security in 
addition to encryption by embedding the encrypted message 
into steganographic carriers, which helps individuals or 
organisations protect sensitive information. For example, a 
message can be steganographically embedded into the least 
significant bits of frames on a CD. Covert steganographic 
channels can be used to bypass the censorship in a hostile 
environment. The covert channel can also be used by the 
adversary as a possible means of information exchange. A 
message can be concealed before distribution by splicing it 
to the end of a copy of a normal audio or video. A 
disgruntled employee may use steganography to ship out the 
most commercially sensitive information. 
VoIP provides real-time audio communication services 
over the Internet, and VoIP packets are discarded 
immediately on arrival. That means that attackers do not 
normally have sufficient time to detect whether VoIP 
dynamic streams contain the hidden message or not. The 
real-time character of VoIP is useful in protecting the 
message hidden in their streams; however, the real-time 
requirements make it hard to perform necessary 
operations to embed the message into the streams 
without causing signal distortion. 
VoIP communications consist of two phases: signalling 
phase and conversation phase. The signalling phase sets 
up and negotiates VoIP session parameters between the 
communicating parties. The most popular signalling 
protocol is called Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). As 
mutual authentication is a cryptographic scheme used to 
convince parties of each other’s identity and to exchange 
session keys, it is typically used only when an extra level 
of security is needed, especially in VoIP communications 
[3]. Some key agreement protocols and authentication 
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schemes [4-8] were proposed to improve the VoIP 
security in the signalling phase, but research on the 
protection of the VoIP conversation phase falls behind. 
Security measures like the Triple Data Encryption 
Algorithm (3DES) provide protection for radio-frequency-
identification communications [9], but their complexity, 
time consuming and increasing computational power 
make them unable to provide security for real-time VoIP 
communications. Thus, an alternative measure like 
steganography is sought for VoIP communications.  
Traditional Least Significant Bit (LSB)-based algorithms 
used in image steganography are prone to statistical 
analysis. Directly applying LSB to VoIP steganography 
certainly inherits its vulnerability, but the highly 
redundant representation in VoIP packets allows subtle 
modifications that preserve the perceptual content of the 
underlying packets. The use of a chaotic map in the 
modification process could strengthen VoIP 
steganography due to its added complexity, which is a 
motivation of this study. 
Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) codec is the most basic 
speech codec that exists in a large majority of speech 
codecs. So VoIP steganography with PCM was investi-
gated in this study. And a new self-adaptive 
steganographic method based on a logistic chaotic map, 
taking into account the voice character of VoIP, was 
devised to realise real-time covert VoIP communications. 
The technical merits of this study are summarised as fol-
lows: 
a) Active voice period detection-based secure, self-
adaptive and real-time covert VoIP communications over 
networks using a logistic chaotic map; 
b) Performance evaluation with state-of-the-art 
network equipment Digital Speech Level Analyser, unlike 
previous works with performance evaluation being 
conducted using in-house software with low precision; 
c) Security tests carried out using the Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon method, instead of conventional statistical tests. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, the related work is briefly introduced. Section 3 
describes in detail our proposed real-time covert VoIP 
communications scheme based on self-adaptive audio 
steganography. The experimental setup is given in 
Section 4. Experimental results, security analysis and 
performance comparisons are discussed in Section 5. The 
final section concludes the paper. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Embedding a message into the payload of VoIP streams is 
one of the most widely researched steganographic 
methods. Some related works are introduced below. 
Attempts have been made to improve the security of 
VoIP communications. As the LSB method is one of the 
most popular data embedding methods due to its low 
complexity and high capacity, LSB-based embedding 
techniques have been applied to VoIP communications. 
Kratzer et al. [10] reported a design of VoIP 
steganography, which substituted the bitstream of a 
secret message for the least significant bits of cover audio. 
Wang et al. [11] proposed a method of using the LSBs of 
voice samples to carry secret communications, and 
described a design of real-time speech hiding with G.711 
codec, which was implemented in Linphone. They 
compressed the secret speech with Speex, before 
embedding it into the LSBs of voice samples. In these 
studies, the bitstream of the secret message to be hidden 
was uniformly distributed in cover objects using LSB 
substitution, which is most likely to be detected by 
statistical analysis. Besides, their works mainly focused 
on the designs of steganographic algorithms, neglecting 
the effects of the characteristic of VoIP conversation on 
VoIP steganography. 
Huang et al. [12] suggested an algorithm for 
embedding data in some parameters of inactive speech 
frames encoded by G.723.1 codec, which was a high-
capacity steganographic method. In addition, Huang et al. 
[13] proposed an algorithm for steganography in low bit-
rate VoIP audio streams by integrating data hiding into 
the process of speech encoding. 
Tian et al. [14] designed an M-sequence-based LSB 
steganographic algorithm for embedding information in 
VoIP streams encoded by G.729a codec. Tian et al. [15] 
also proposed an adaptive partial-matching 
steganographic method with triple M sequences, which 
used a partial similarity value to evaluate the partial 
matching between the cover object and the secret data. 
They introduced three sequences: the first was used to 
eliminate the correlation between the secret data and the 
cover object; the second was utilised to guide an adaptive 
embedding process; the last was used for encrypting 
synchronization signalling patterns. 
Aoki [16] proposed a lossless steganographic approach 
for u-law of G.711 codec, which embedded a secret 
message into ‘0’ speech samples by exploiting the 
characteristic that a ‘0’ speech sample could be 
represented by two codes ‘+0’ and ‘-0’. If ‘0’ was required 
to be embedded into a ‘0’ speech sample, the sign of the 
speech sample was modified to ‘-’. Its steganographic 
capacity depended on the number of ‘0’ speech samples, 
so its applicability is limited. 
In 2017, Tian et al. put forward a bitrate modulating 
based steganographic algorithm with Hamming matrix 
encoding [17], but its practicality needs further study. 
Balasubramaniyan et al. developed a PinDr0p 
mechanism to detect and measure single-ended VoIP 
audio features to identify all the applied voice codecs, 
and calculate packet loss and noise profiles with over 90% 
accuracy [18]. 
Peeters et al. [19] presented a Sonar system that de-
tected the presence of SS7 redirection attacks by securely 
measuring audio round-trip times between telephony 
devices, capable of detecting 70.9% of redirected calls 
between call endpoints of varying attacker proximity (300 
- 7100 miles) with low false positive rates (0.3%). 
More recently, Jiang et al. designed a reversible data 
hiding in encrypted domain scheme with low 
computational complexity for three-dimensional meshes 
[20]. Zhang et al. suggested a coverless steganographic 
algorithm based on discrete cosine transform and latent 
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dirichlet allocation topic classification, having robustness 
against common image processing and better ability to 
resist steganalysis [21]. 
Some researchers have engaged in VoIP steganalysis. 
Steganalysis is the science of detecting the message 
hidden using steganography, which is to distinguish the 
stego data from the cover object. Huang et al. [22] 
proposed a steganalysis method to detect covert VoIP 
communications, which used a sliding window 
mechanism and an improved regular singular (RS) 
algorithm. Huang et al. [23] suggested a steganalysis 
method that employed the second detection and 
regression analysis, which not only detected the hidden 
message in the compressed VoIP speech, but also 
accurately estimated the data embedding length. 
However, the successfulness of VoIP steganalysis 
depends heavily on the steganographic algorithm used in 
covert VoIP communications. 
In summary, a great deal of research has been 
conducted on the basic techniques of VoIP steganography 
and steganalysis, but few studies have been carried out to 
discover the most appropriate data embedding locations 
in VoIP streams affected by the voice character during 
active and inactive speech periods. To bridge the 
knowledge gap, this study presents a new self-adaptive 
steganographic method using a specially designed Active 
Voice Period Detection algorithm and a logistic chaotic 
map, which can achieve real-time self-adaptive covert 
VoIP communications with negligible signal distortion. 
3 PROPOSED REAL-TIME COVERT VOIP 
COMMUNICATIONS SCHEME 
The proposed self-adaptive covert VoIP communications 
scheme is based on the connectionless User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP), which focuses on low-overhead 
operation and reduced latency to meet the real-time 
requirements of VoIP communications. The covert VoIP 
communications are realised by embedding secret data 
into audio signals encoded by PCM codec. The audio 
signals are chosen by an Active Voice Period Detection 
(AVPD) algorithm, which decides whether a VoIP packet 
carries active voice data (Active speech period) or inactive 
voice data (Inactive speech period). The bitstream of secret 
data is not uniformly embedded into the audio signals, 
but is distributed randomly using random sequences 
generated from a logistic chaotic map. 
The initial parameters of the chaotic map can be 
exchanged between the communicating parties in three 
ways. Firstly, a device (e.g. smartcard) is used to hold the 
cryptographic parameters. Having a smart card on the 
top of VoIP is acceptable for a local VoIP network with 
few users, but is unlikely to implement in practice due to 
a massive number of VoIP users in real VoIP 
communication. Secondly, the parameters can be 
embedded into VoIP protocols such as the SIP signalling 
protocol. However, this method would affect and disrupt 
the functioning of the SIP signalling protocol that 
establishes connections between the users in the VoIP 
signalling phase. Thirdly, a key-distribution scheme is 
utilised to exchange the parameters, which is adopted in 
this scheme to distribute the initial parameters in the 
VoIP conversation phase after a connection is established 
via SIP. 
In this study, the use of a key-distribution scheme to 
exchange the initial parameters of the chaotic map 
between the VoIP users is to avoid affecting and 
disrupting the functioning of the SIP signalling protocol 
that is used to establish connections between the 
communicating parties in the signalling phase in real-
time VoIP communication. So the proposed 
steganographic channel is integrated with VoIP 
communication without causing perceptible signal 
distortion. 
Before data embedding, the initial parameters of the 
chaotic map are exchanged between the communicating 
parties using the Diffie–Hellman key exchange scheme 
[24], which is indeed widely used, in the VoIP 
conversation phase. As Diffie–Hellman provides no 
authentication of the two communicating partners, this 
vulnerability needs to be overcome with the use of digital 
signatures and public-key certificates. Thus, the 
communicating parties in the proposed covert VoIP 
system are authenticated by means of elliptic curve 
digital signatures. The elliptic curve digital signatures are 
executed in a short space of time (~190 ms) [7], which is 
shorter than the acceptable latency of 400 ms for one-way 
VoIP communication, so they do not affect the real-time 
performance of the VoIP communication system. The 
extraction of the secret data hidden in the audio signals is 
carried out on the receiver side, which is a reverse process 
of data embedding. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Sketch of the proposed covert VoIP communications. 
Figure 1 shows one way communication of the 
proposed covert VoIP communications. A speech stream 
is first detected by the AVPD function to decide whether 
it is in the active speech period or in the inactive speech 
period. A logistic chaotic map is used to generate random 
sequences that choose the embedding locations in the 
speech stream for the bitstream of secret data to be 
hidden. The chaotic map-based data embedding 
algorithm has great complexity, compared to simple LSB 
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replacement with low complexity in literature. The 
speech stream with the hidden secret data is then 
encapsulated into packets and sent to the receiver. 
Otherwise, the speech stream is directly packed into 
packets and sent to the receiver. On the receiver side, 
after the arriving packets are unpacked, the speech 
stream is detected by AVPD until the secret data is 
extracted. Finally, the speech stream goes through the 
extraction process or is played back for listening. 
The meanings of the symbols, used in the self-adaptive 
covert VoIP communications scheme, are provided in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 Table of notations 
Symbol Meaning 
a 
C 
c 
E 
H 
j 
M 
m 
N 
P-value 
Pc 
p 
Q 
R 
r 
S 
s 
S2 
W 
x 
x0 
 
xn 
z* 
µ 
σ 
Parameter of Tent map 
Set of cover objects 
Cover object 
Mean of variance 
Hypothesis value 
Current sample 
Secret data set 
Secret data 
Number of samples in the speech stream 
Probability 
Probability distribution 
Largest interval 
Space of possible measurements 
Embedding location set 
Embedding location 
Least significant bit set 
Least significant bit 
Sampling distribution 
Space of possible measurements 
Random number 
Initial ratio of the population to the maximum 
population 
Value of x0 after n iterations 
Test statistic 
Positive number 
Square root of variance 
 
3.1 Active Voice Period Detection 
There is no fixed voice activity detection module in PCM 
codec, so an AVPD algorithm is devised to minimise the 
impact of data embedding on speech quality. The AVPD 
algorithm uses a threshold to decide whether the speech 
in an audio packet has fallen into an active or inactive 
speech period. Although sometimes active and inactive 
speech periods are not distinguishable accurately, the 
AVPD can distinguish the majority of active and inactive 
speech periods in an audio packet. 
 The threshold for an active voice is determined after 
analysing audio data in the first few packets, in which 
only environmental noises exist in normal circumstances 
at the beginning of the conversation phase. Hence, the 
AVPD algorithm is effective in a real environment where 
users speak in a background noise. 
Analogue to a delta-sigma modulator as a two-level 
dynamic quantizer to encode and decode signals [25], 
PCM codec uses a perception model-based compression 
method to code audio, which can yield high speech 
quality. To digitise an audio signal, the first step is 
sampling, and the nominal value recommended for the 
sampling rate is 8 kHz. The second step is quantization, 
i.e. transforming the sampling signal amplitude into a 
numeric value with binary digits. The sample signal 
values in inactive speech periods are smaller than those in 
active speech periods.  
To decide whether the speech in an audio packet has 
fallen into active or inactive speech periods, a threshold 
value for the energy level of the signal is set to distinguish 
between active and inactive sample signal values. 
Normally, at the beginning of the conversation phase, 
there are few milliseconds of insignificant voice between 
the communicating parties. The first few packets are then 
analysed to obtain the threshold signal value which is 
defined as: 
€ 
Threshold = Max +OffsetValue         (1) 
where Max is the maximum value among all the sample 
signal values of the first few packets, and OffsetValue is an 
offset value which is less than Max. A large number of 
tests showed that the best range of OffsetValue is [0, 
threshold*2/3) with excellent AVPD results. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Pseudo code of the AVPD function for PCM codec. 
If more than half of the sample signal values of an 
audio packet are larger than the Threshold, the speech in 
the audio packet is considered to be in an active speech 
period. Otherwise, it is in an inactive speech period. 
Figure 2 shows the pseudo code of the AVPD function in 
our covert VoIP communications system. If the AVPD 
function returns a true value, it means that the speech 
stream is active. 
Figure 3 shows an example of a speech waveform 
where inactive and active speech periods are determined 
by AVPD. Clearly there are three active speech periods 
(marked with rectangles) in the figure. A sample signal 
value of an audio packet might be vulnerable to being 
modified through the network, but the active or inactive 
character of the packet is unlikely to be changed. Thus, it 
is more conducive to distinguish active and inactive 
speech periods before data embedding. 
 
Fig. 3. Example of a speech waveform with active periods 
determined by AVPD. 
3.2 Logistic Chaotic Map to Choose Embedding 
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Locations 
Chaos is a stochastic phenomenon of nonlinear 
deterministic system in the nature. The uncertainty of 
random sequence is resulted from the internal factor of a 
chaotic dynamical system. A chaotic map is extremely 
sensitive to the initial conditions and the parameters of 
the chaotic map. So a mass of noise-like but determinate 
random sequences can be obtained from a chaotic map. 
The random sequence can be reproduced from the same 
chaotic map with the constant initial condition. In 
comparison with other pseudo random sequence 
generation algorithms such as Mersenne Twister method, 
using a logistic map to generate a random sequence is 
straightforward and convenient to implement. 
In the proposed scheme, a series of random sequences 
generated from a logistic chaotic map are used to choose 
data embedding locations in VoIP streams. The utilization 
of chaotic map makes data embedding in VoIP streams 
randomly, and it is unlikely to predict the initial condi-
tions of random sequences. So the properties of the cha-
otic map can increase the security of covert communica-
tions. To meet the real-time requirement, it needs to 
minimize the time to generate random sequences. Mean-
while, it is necessary to know the initial parameters with 
infinite precision for sensitivity of the chaotic map, so that 
the initial parameters can be transmitted securely be-
tween the communicating parties in the conversation 
phase. 
A logistic map is one of the most popular models for 
discrete nonlinear dynamical systems. The map is 
popularized in a seminal paper by the biologist Robert 
May, in part as a discrete-time demographic model 
analogous to the logistic equation first created by Pierre 
Francois Verhulst [26]. A logistic map is given by 
€ 
xn+1 = µxn (1− xn )                 (2) 
where x0 is the initial ratio of the population to the 
maximum population at year 0, xn denotes the value of x0 
after n iterations, a number between 0 and 1, and the ratio 
of existing population to the maximum possible 
population after n years, and µ is a positive number 
which stands for a combined rate for reproduction and 
starvation. 
 
Fig. 4. Bifurcation diagram of a logistic map when x0 = 0.52. 
Figure 4 depicts a bifurcation diagram of a logistic 
map when x0 = 0.52. As Fig. 4 shows, when , the 
value of x is equal or close to 0. When , x quickly 
approaches the value of µ-1/µ. It shows chaotic 
characteristics when µ varies in the range (3.57, 4]. When 
µ = 4, x becomes increasingly chaotic. Figure 5 shows the 
ergodic property of chaos, when x0 = 0.52 and µ = 4 in the 
equation of a logistic map. As can be seen from Fig. 5, the 
value of xn randomly falls in the range (0, 1] as n increases 
between (0,10000]. 
Tent map is also a discrete-time dynamical system 
model. The original formula for the Tent map can be writ-
ten as: 
   
        
                       (3) 
 
Fig. 5. Values of xn with n increasing when x0 = 0.52 and µ = 4.
  
 
To extend the mapping range, the improved Tent map 
is obtained: 
                         (4) 
In equation (4), , , and . For the 
Tent map, the parameters are a = 16, µ = 1.99, and x0 = 
0.552. The parameter values of the logistic map are x0 = 
0.52 and µ = 4. As Figs. 6 and 7 show, after 30000 itera-
tions, the statistical distribution of the numbers generated 
from the logistic map is ‘U’ shape distributed. And the 
statistical distribution of the numbers from the improved 
Tent map is almost uniformly distributed. 
 
Fig. 6. Statistical distribution of numbers (Y axis) generated from the 
logistic map (X axis: xn). 
 
Fig. 7. Statistical distribution of numbers (Y axis) generated from 
the improved Tent map (X axis: xn). 
Since x is between 0 and 1, some adjustments need to 
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be made to obtain a random sequence of integers from the 
logistic map. Suppose x0 and µ are given as certain values 
in Equation (2), a sequence of x can then be yielded and 
denoted by X as 
                   (5) 
and    (6) 
where R is the embedding location set, r is the embedding 
location, and p is the largest interval. To get x = 16, the 
adjustment for the Tent map is xn = floor(xn) + 1. 
As Fig. 8 shows, after adjustment the statistical distri-
bution of numbers from the improved tent map is still 
uniformly distributed. As can been seen from Fig. 9, when 
x is in [1, 16] the numbers generated are around 2000, and 
the numbers from the logistic map are almost evenly 
distributed too. 
 
Fig. 8. Statistical distribution of numbers  (Y axis) generated from 
the improved tent map after adjustment (X axis: xn). 
The sequence of R is utilized in the proposed covert 
VoIP communications. p is an integer, which represents 
the largest interval, and the value of p is in the range of 2 
to 35 [27]. The PESQ scores and SNR values are stable 
before the embedding interval reaches 35. ri is used to 
determine the data embedding locations in VoIP streams 
to embed the bitstream of secret data. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Statistical distribution of numbers (Y axis) generated from 
the improved logistic map after adjustment (X axis: xn). 
3.3 Data Embedding Algorithm 
A new data embedding algorithm is used to embed secret 
data in VoIP cover-speech streams. It is based on bit 
substitution with payloads using a random sequence to 
determine the data embedding location, i.e. where to 
embed the bitstream of secret data. At the beginning, 
there are two choices: either embedding secret data into 
an active or inactive speech period of VoIP streams. If 
data embedding in an active speech period is chosen, the 
embedding algorithm waits until the active speech period 
starts. An important parameter ActiveChoice is set to 
represent the choice. If the value of ActiveChoice is ‘false’, 
secret data is embedded in inactive speech periods, and 
the algorithm continues with inactive speech periods. If 
the value of ActiveChoice is set to ‘true’, the bitstream of 
secret data is embedded in active speech periods. 
Assuming user A wants to send L bits of secret data M 
to user B, the secret data is described as M = {mi| i = 
0,1,2,...,L-1}. If the number of samples in the piece of 
speech of each packet is N, the least significant bit set of 
samples can be denoted by S = {si| i = 0,1,2,..., N-1}. The 
data embedding algorithm is designed as follows: 
Step 1: Execute the function of AVPD to detect 
whether a VoIP packet carries active or inactive voice 
data, if the returned value of AVPD is equal to Ac-
tivChoice, go to Step 2; otherwise, go to Step 4. The initial 
value of j is 0, and s0 is the least significant bit of the first 
sample in the chosen piece of speech. 
Step 2: Obtain a random xi from a logistic chaotic map, 
calculate ri = xi ×1000 (mod p) + 1 as the data embedding 
interval to decide the data embedding location in VoIP 
streams. 
Step 3: Suppose the least significant bit of the current 
sample is sj, if j+ri < N, replace 
€ 
s j+ri with mi, then perform 
j = j+ri, i = i+1, repeat Steps 2 and 3 until the end of the 
current piece of speech S, i.e., j+ri >= N. 
Step 4: Encapsulate the piece of speech in a packet to 
be sent; go to the next piece of speech, and repeat Step 1 
until the secret data is embedded completely. 
3.4 Data Extraction Algorithm 
In the conversation phase, the receiver obtains the initial 
parameters of a logistic map, which is used to generate 
random sequences that randomly choose data embedding 
locations, and the value of ActiveChoice which determines 
where to extract the secret data hidden in VoIP streams. 
The same initial parameters and the value of ActiveChoice 
enable the receiver to successfully retrieve the secret data. 
The extraction process is a reverse phase of the data 
embedding process. After receiving an audio packet, the 
least significant bit set of samples can be denoted by S’ 
={s’i | i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N-1}. The logistic chaotic map 
generates a corresponding random number xi that decides 
the extraction location. The following steps are performed 
to extract the original secret data on the receiver side. 
Step 1: Execute the AVPD function to detect whether a 
VoIP packet carries active or inactive voice data; if the 
returned value of AVPD is equal to ActiveChoice, go to 
Step 2; otherwise, go to Step 4. The initial value of j is 0, 
and s’0 is the least significant bit of the first sample in the 
chosen piece of speech. 
Step 2: Generate a random number xi from a logistic 
chaotic map, and calculate ri to decide the extraction loca-
tion. 
Step 3: Suppose the least significant bit of the current 
sample is 
€ 
s j' , if j+ri < N, get 
€ 
s j+ri
' as mi, then perform j = 
j+ri, i = i+1, repeat Step 2 and Step 3 until the end of the 
current piece of speech S’’, i.e., j+ri >= N. 
Step 4: Play audio, receive the next audio packet, and 
repeat Step 1 until the completion of extracting the secret 
data M. 
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4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
4.1 Covert VoIP Communications System 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed 
steganographic algorithm, speech samples coded by PCM 
were employed as the cover-speech. The steganographic 
algorithm was used in our VoIP communications system 
called StegPhone. In the StegPhone system, end-user 
terminals (the communicating parties) are connected to a 
VoIP proxy server through an IP local network. Its end-
user interface is shown in Fig. 10. 
 
Fig.10. End-user interface. 
StegPhone was developed in-house using C++ and 
MFC. The implement of speech signal acquisition and 
playback is based on winmm.lib which is a multimedia 
API, and the real-time transmission of audio packets is 
carried out by means of jrtplib 3.9.1 library. The transport 
protocol is UDP. 
As Fig. 11 shows, the StegPhone VoIP system used the 
SIP signalling protocol to establish connections between 
two communicating parties, the media protocol to handle 
the real-time audio communication, and the IP protocol 
for VoIP voice transmission. These protocols were 
implemented on a VoIP server. 
 
Fig. 11. StegPhone VoIP system. 
The communicating party’s IP address was needed to 
initialize VoIP communications, and the parameters used 
for sampling and quantizing the cover-speech were then 
selected. It was convenient to choose between data 
embedding in an active speech period and that in an 
inactive speech period. 
The VoIP audio samples were obtained by using 
single-channel and sampling at 8 kHz. Each sample was 
represented with 16 bits. There were 2048 samples in each 
audio packet. The initial values of the logistic chaotic map 
were given as follows: , , ......, 
. 
The value of xi was used for determining the 
embedding location R in VoIP streams for data 
embedding. The value of p in equation (6) was 
determined to be 16 as the largest interval, and ri was 
used for determining the embedding location in VoIP 
streams for data embedding.  
In general, a key distribution occurs with short time-
consuming and small communications traffic. The ex-
change of the chaotic initial condition is a kind of key 
distribution, and 8 bytes are sufficient for the value of x0 
and u to be transmitted. As the length of secret data in 
covert communications is time-dependent and there are 
more than 700 bytes secret message in our experiment, it 
is impracticable to envoy secret data using a key 
distribution method. 
The experiments for testing the speech quality of the 
cover-speech and stego-speech samples were conducted 
using Digital Speech Level Analyser (DSLA). In the 
experiments, a player was used to playback records of 
English audio as the cover-speech to microphone. The 
audio samples were standard English records obtained 
from DSLA. The covert VoIP communications were 
achieved through a VoIP proxy server (a component of 
StegPhone) over our laboratory’s local area network. 
Comparisons between cover-speech and stego-speech 
samples were carried out at the end of the VoIP call. On 
the receiver side, Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality 
(PESQ) scores and Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) values of 
the speech samples were measured using DSLA II, which 
is a high-accuracy equipment made by Malden 
Electronics Ltd. in the United Kingdom. 
4.2 Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality 
According to ITU-T Recommendation, PESQ is an 
objective method for end-to-end speech quality 
assessment of narrow-band telephone networks and 
speech codecs [28]. PESQ requires two inputs, the original 
unprocessed test signal and the degraded version that has 
been passed through the distorting system. Figure 12 
illustrates the processing carried out by PESQ. To 
compare the signals, the reference speech signal and the 
degraded signal should be at the same, constant power 
level. The model begins by aligning the original and 
degraded signals to a standard listening level. They are 
then filtered with an input filter to model the standard 
telephone handset. The system under test may include a 
delay, which may be variable. To compare the original 
and degraded signals, they need to be lined up with each 
other. The signals are aligned in time and then processed 
through an auditory transform that mimics certain key 
properties of human hearing  and the auditory transform 
gives a representation in time and frequency of the 
perceived loudness of the signal, known as the sensation 
surface. The difference between the sensation surfaces for 
the signals is known as the error surface. Two error 
parameters are extracted from the disturbance, are 
aggregated in frequency and time, and are mapped to a 
prediction of subjective mean opinion score (MOS). 
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Fig. 12. Signal processing in PESQ. 
The aim of the amended recommendation ITU-T 
P.862.1 is to provide a single mapping from the raw P.862 
score to the Listening Quality Objective Mean Opinion 
Score (MOS-LQO). The mapping from PESQ score to 
PESQ P.862.1 is given by: 
         (7) 
4.3 Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
SNR is a measure that compares the level of a desired 
signal to the level of a background noise. It is defined as 
the power ratio between the signal and the background 
noise, often expressed in decibels. As many signals have a 
very wide dynamic range, SNRs are often expressed 
using the logarithmic decibel scale. In decibels, SNR is 
defined as:         
                                              (8) 
where Psignal and Pnoise are the levels of the signal and the 
noise in decibels, respectively. SNR is usually taken to 
indicate an average signal-to-noise ratio, as it is possible 
that instantaneous signal-to-noise ratios are considerably 
different. 
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To compare data embedding in active and inactive speech 
periods, two sets of tests upon data embedding in active 
and inactive speech samples were carried out, 
respectively. Eighty female and male speech samples 
were used as cover objects in the experiments. Each 
experiment was repeated 12 times. About 8.7 seconds of 
audio in a stego-speech sample were taken for each test. 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed 
steganographic algorithm, the corresponding 8.7 seconds 
of the cover-speech were used as the reference. The 8.7 
seconds of speech contain 69632 sampling points with 16 
bits, i.e. 34 audio packets. The size of the hidden message 
in the speech stream is 745 bytes, equivalent to about 130 
English words in a text file. 
The sample signal values of normal VoIP speech are 
much larger than the threshold according to the definition 
of AVPD. The sample values after data embedding in 
VoIP packets vary in a range of -1 to 1, which means that 
it does not affect the active or inactive character of the 
VoIP packets. In addition, under the same initial 
parameters of the chaotic map, the same random 
sequences are generated and then used to determine the 
extraction locations for successfully retrieving the secret 
message on the receiver side. Thus, the rate of 
successfully extracting the secret message can reach 100% 
in a network without packet-loss. And all the experiments 
are on the basis of successfully extracting the hidden 
message from the received pieces of speech. 
5.1 Active Speech Periods Using Logistic Maps 
Figures 13(a), 13(b), 14(a) and 14(b) show the waveforms 
in the time-domain and the spectrums in the frequency-
domain of female and male cover-speech and stego-
speech samples with data embedding in active speech 
periods, respectively, and the AVPD detection results for 
the cover-speech samples. Close analysis of the figures 
reveals that there are almost no differences in the 
waveforms and spectrums between the cover-speech and 
stego-speech samples. That means that the proposed 
steganographic algorithm has no or little impact on the 
original cover-speech in the time and frequency domains. 
 
   
Female cover-speech    Female speech AVPD     Female stego-speech 
Fig. 13(a). Comparisons in time-domain of female cover-speech and 
stego-speech with data embedding in active speech periods. 
      
 Female cover-speech         Female stego-speech 
Fig. 13(b). Comparisons in frequency-domain of female cover-
speech and stego-speech with data embedding in active speech 
periods. 
    
    Male cover-speech           Male speech AVPD        Male stego-speech 
Fig. 14(a). Comparisons in time-domain of male cover-speech and 
stego-speech with data embedding in active speech periods. 
       
Male cover-speech               Male stego-speech 
Fig. 14(b). Comparisons in frequency-domain of male cover-speech 
and stego-speech with data embedding in active speech periods. 
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In PESQ measurements, the audio signal captured on 
the sender side was served as the reference signal for 
DSLA input, and two speech categories were measured as 
the degraded signals. One category is the stego-speech 
with the hidden message received on the receiver side, 
marked as ‘stego’. The other category is the cover-speech 
without the hidden message received on the receiver side, 
denoted as ‘original’. 
Table 2 lists the PESQ P.862.1 scores of female and 
male cover-speech (original) and stego-speech (stego) 
samples with data embedding in active speech periods, 
respectively. The variances shown in the table are the 
differences in PESQ P.862.1 scores between the ‘original’ 
and ‘stego’ speech samples. As can be seen from Table 2, 
the impact that the local network alone made on the 
cover-speech was negligible. The small variances 
indicated that the proposed steganographic algorithm 
caused little degradation in speech quality, indicative of 
effective covert VoIP communications. 
 
Table 2 PESQ P.862.1 scores for female and male speech samples 
PESQ P.862.1 
Degraded signal 
Max Min Mean Variance 
Original 4.55 4.54 4.545 --- 
Female 
Stego 4.21 4.19 4.200 0.345 
Original 4.55 4.54 4.545 --- 
Male 
Stego 4.39 4.39 4.390 0.155 
 
Table 3 SNR values (dB) for female and male speech samples 
Female Male Degraded signal 
Original Stego Original Stego 
Max 36.60 35.40 34.70 32.40 
Min 36.00 35.00 33.30 32.40 Cover speech Mean 36.30 35.20 34.00 32.40 
Max 34.50 33.10 32.40 30.70 
Min 33.30 32.00 31.20 30.10 Stego speech Mean 33.90 32.55 31.80 30.4 
Variance 2.40 2.65 2.20 2.00 
 
Table 3 shows the SNR values and their variances of 
speech samples for active speech tests.  The SNR values of 
the stego-speech samples were close to those of the cover-
speech samples for female and male speech samples, 
respectively, which signified that the proposed 
steganographic algorithm had no or little impact on the 
quality of the cover-speech samples. 
5.2 Inactive Speech Periods Using Logistic Maps 
Table 4 lists the PESQ P.862.1 scores and their variances 
of female and male speech samples for inactive speech 
tests. Analysis of the PESQ variances shows that the 
proposed steganographic algorithm caused little 
degradation in speech quality, indicative of effective 
covert VoIP communications. 
 
Table 4 Results for data embedding in inactive speech periods 
PESQ P.862.1 Degraded signal 
Max Min Mean Variance 
Original 4.55 4.54 4.545 --- Female 
Stego 4.02 4.02 4.020 0.525 
Original 4.55 4.54 4.545 --- Male Stego 3.93 3.93 3.930 0.615 
 
As Table 5 shows, for female or male speech samples, 
the SNR values of the stego-speech samples are slightly 
lower than those of the cover-speech samples, which 
meant that some distortions between the waveforms of 
‘stego’ and ‘original’ speech samples existed. These 
results are evidenced by the amplitude increases in the 
waveforms in the time-domain. 
 
Table 5 SNR results (dB) for data embedding in inactive speech 
periods 
Female Male Degraded signal Original Stego Original Stego 
Max 36.60 33.50 34.70 33.80 
Min 36.00 33.50 33.30 33.30 Cover speech Mean 36.30 33.50 34.00 33.55 
Max 34.50 25.20 32.40 25.20 
Min 33.30 24.90 31.20 24.90 Stego speech Mean 33.90 25.05 31.80 25.05 
Variance 2.40 8.45 2.20 8.50 
 
5.3 Comparisons of Different Tests 
Figure 15 shows the variances in the mean PESQ score 
and the variances in the SNR value between the cover-
speech and stego-speech samples. The ‘Active female’ 
and ‘Inactive female’ represent the female speech tests 
with data embedding in active and inactive speech 
periods, respectively. The ‘Active male’ and ‘Inactive 
male’ stand for the experimental results for the male 
speech samples with data embedding in active and 
inactive speech periods, respectively. 
As Fig. 15 shows, for both SNR scores illustrated in 
histogram and PESQ values plotted as the blue curve, the 
variances for data embedding in active speech periods are 
smaller than those for data embedding in inactive speech 
periods. Since the sample signal values of inactive speech 
are much smaller and close to 0 resulting in small 
amplitudes, data embedding in inactive speech periods 
leads to significant changes to the amplitudes. That 
means that inactive speech periods are more sensitive to 
changes in sample values than active speech periods. 
These results indicated that data embedding in active 
speech periods has much less impact on the speech 
quality of VoIP communications for both female and male 
speech samples. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Comparisons of variances for data embedding in active and 
inactive speech periods. 
To compare the steganographic algorithm with Logis-
tic map and the one with Tent map, the experiments with 
similar noise backgrounds were carried out. And the re-
sults are shown in Fig. 16. It is clear that, for both female 
and male speech samples, if data embedding in VoIP 
packets with inactive speech periods occurs, the variance 
of PESQ P.862.1 scores is estimated to be around 0.5; if 
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data are embedded into VoIP packets with active speech 
periods, the variance of PESQ P.862.1 is about 0.1. 
In addition, the changes in PESQ P.862.1 score between 
the steganographic algorithms with Logistic map and 
Tent map in the same tests were about 0.03, which means 
there is no impact on PESQ, indicating that the 
steganographic algorithms with Logistic map and Tent 
map work similarly. 
 
Fig. 16. Average PESQ P.862.1 scores for female and male speech 
samples. 
5.4 Security Analysis 
For covert communications, the essential security is that it 
would not cause any suspicion from attackers. Once se-
cret communications are suspicious, or attackers have 
noticed that there is an underlying communications 
channel, the whole covert communications system is not 
safe, because attackers can intercept and even destroy the 
communications. 
A. Adversarial model 
Cachin’s definition of steganographic security with a 
passive adversary is widely accepted in the literature [1, 
30]. It assumes that the warden will permit Alice to send 
any cover object, c, to Bob, provided it is drawn from a 
probability distribution, PC, and PC(c) is the probability of 
drawing a cover object from this distribution, where C is 
the set of all cover objects [29]. 
A measure of security for steganographic systems is 
the statistical distance (ε) between the cover and stego 
objects, 
€ 
ε =
Q0 ⊆C
min PC (c)
c∈Q0
∑ − PC (c)
c∉Q0
∑  and 
€ 
Q0 ⊂Q, where Q0 is 
a plausible space and Q is the space of possible measure-
ments. 
If a stochastic process U is used to simulate the send-
ing of the secret message in the ith packet, the total 
probability distribution of the message over Q can be ex-
pressed as 
€ 
PU (c) =ηPM (c) + (1−η)PC (c)    (9) 
where PM is the probability distribution of the secret mes-
sage, and η is the probability that ‘1’ appears in a period. 
As 
€ 
PM (c) =
PC (c)
1+ε , c ∈Q0
PC (c)
1−ε , c ∈Q1
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
    (10) 
where Q1 is the other plausible space of possible meas-
urements, the relative entropy between the cover and 
stego objects of a steganographic system is given by 
    (11) 
For two N-level random sequences in covert VoIP 
communications, η = 2n-1 2n-1/(2n - 1)(2n - 1), it has 
     (12) 
Equation (12) shows that the proposed covert VoIP com-
munications scheme is ε-secure against passive adver-
saries. 
B. Adversary attacks 
The steganographic security follows the same path as 
security in cryptography [1]. The security of covert 
steganographic communication lies in the fact that 
nobody has so far been able to produce an attack 
substantially faster than brute-force search for the key. 
In the proposed steganographic algorithm, the Diffie–
Hellman key exchange scheme [24] is used to securely 
exchange the initial parameters of the chaotic map 
between the communicating parties that are 
authenticated using elliptic curve digital signatures [7]. 
The use of authentication with the digital signatures can 
prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, which are particularly 
possible on wireless networks. 
However, there are limitations on resisting tampering 
attacks. Mutual authentication could be used to prevent 
tampering attacks, and it is a good solution to resist 
tampering attacks by sending an authentication message 
of secret data to the receiver. If the verification fails on the 
receiver side, the secret data would be retransmitted. 
Although the utilization of Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) could resist the tampering attack, but the 
computation of MAC is costing, which would add latency 
and lead to speech distortion. Besides, MAC is a kind of 
redundant message which would reduce the available 
embedding capacity. Thus, it is difficult to achieve 
security and efficiency simultaneously in real-time VoIP 
communications with steganography. 
C. Statistical significance test 
The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (M-W-W) test was 
adopted to evaluate the security of the proposed 
steganographic algorithm. As a non-parametric 
significance test, the M-W_W can assess whether two 
independent samples of observations come from the same 
distribution [30]. Comparisons in probability 
distributions between the cover-speech and the stego-
speech show whether the differences are almost 
indistinguishable.  
When the sample sizes are sufficiently large, the M-W-
W test is based on the standardized test statistic z*: 
                              (13) 
where E{S2} and σ{S2} are the mean and square root of 
variance of the sampling distribution S2 that is the 
combination of the two samples of observations to be 
assessed. If |z*| ≤ 1.960, the null hypothesis is true (H = 
0); If |z*| > 1.960, the null hypothesis is false (H = 1). 
In statistical significance testing, the P-value is the 
probability of obtaining a test statistic at least as extreme 
as the one that is actually observed, assuming that the 
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null hypothesis is true. The null hypothesis is rejected 
when the P-value turns out to be less than a certain 
observed significance level, often 0.05 or 0.01. In the test, 
the significance level was set to be 0.05, and the number 
of samples in cover-speech and stego-speech were 69632. 
 
Table 6 M-W-W test results for the Logistic map 
Test Rank sum z* P-value H 
Active female 4.8493e+9 0.0883 0.9297 0 
Active male 4.8490e+9 0.0532 0.9575 0 
Inactive female 4.8506e+9 0.2626 0.7929 0 
Inactive male 4.8525e+9 0.5131 0.6079 0 
 
Table 6 contains the M-W-W test results and the 
parameters used for comparing the probability 
distribution drawn from the original VoIP streams (cover-
speech) to that drawn from the stego VoIP streams with 
the hidden message (stego-speech). For the proposed 
steganographic algorithm, the maximum value for the 
test statistic (z*) was 0.5131 for the ‘Inactive male’ test, 
given the two sample sizes being 69632 and 69632, 
respectively. Since Max{|z*|} = 0.5131, i.e. |z*| < 1.960, it 
concludes H = 0, which means that the probability 
distributions for the original VoIP streams and the stego 
VoIP streams did not differ, indicating that the proposed 
steganographic algorithm is undetectable in terms of 
statistical analysis. 
As Table 6 shows, the P-values are considerably larger 
than the significance level 0.05 for data embedding in 
active and inactive speech periods. Table 7 shows the val-
ues of H are 0 for all the tests with Tent map. There is 
almost no difference in the results between the 
steganographic algorithms with Logistic map and Tent 
map. 
Table 7 M-W-W test results for the Tent map 
Test Rank sum z* P-value H 
Active female 4.849e+9 -0.0226 0.9819 0 
Active male 4.849e+9 0.0035 0.9972 0 
Inactive female 4.849e+9 -0.2666 0.7898 0 
Inactive male 4.849e+9 -0.3155 0.7524 0 
 
Moreover, the values of H are 0 for all the tests, which 
indicates that the null hypothesis is true, i.e., the cover-
speech and the stego-speech does not differ. That means 
that the proposed steganographic algorithm can 
withstand steganalysis based on statistical analysis. 
5.5 Performance Comparisons between 
Algorithms 
The proposed steganographic algorithm has an adaptive 
feature, and the embedding location is chosen randomly 
according to a random sequence. So the exact 
steganographic bandwidth could not be precisely 
calculated, but it can be determined in a range which is 
correlated with the value of p in equation (6). In our 
experiments, the value of p was 16, and the 
steganographic bandwidth was between 0.5 - 8 kbits/s in 
the selected audio signals.  
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
algorithm, performance comparison was conducted by 
comparing steganographic bandwidth, undetectability, 
and robustness, as shown in Table 8, thereby examining 
and noting the similarities or differences between the 
proposed algorithm and other related algorithms. 
 
Table 8 Comparison of VoIP steganographic algorithms 
 
Steganographic band-
width 
(kbits/s) 
Undetect-
ability Robustness 
Proposed algorithm 0.5 - 8 Yes Yes 
Wu [31]  20 Yes n/a 
Takahashi [32] 8 n/a n/a 
Liu [33] 0.2 Yes n/a 
Tian [34] 0.8 - 2.6 Yes n/a 
Xu [35] 0.1333 n/a n/a 
Miao [36] 7.5 Yes n/a 
 
As Table 8 shows, the proposed algorithm achieved a 
relatively larger steganographic bandwidth with a non-
detectable characteristic. 
6 CONCLUSION 
A self-adaptive audio steganographic scheme for realising 
real-time covert VoIP communications over the Internet 
has been devised in this study. The new scheme was 
succesfully implemented in our StegPhone 
communications system. Two sets of tests (data 
embedding in active and inactive speech periods) were 
conducted for female and male VoIP speech samples, 
respectively. Although the PESQ and SNR variances of 
stego-speech samples for inactive speech periods are 
slightly larger than those for active speech periods, the M-
W-W security analysis shows that the probability 
distributions drawn from the cover-speech and the stego-
speech do not differ for both sets of tests, indicating that 
the proposed steganographic scheme is statistically 
undetectable with negligible signal distortion. Further 
studies are necessary to determine the effectiveness of the 
proposed scheme for other low bit-rate VoIP codecs. 
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